Former Head of State, Yakubu Gowon, has accused late Biafran leader, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, of frustrating repeated efforts to stop the country from sliding into civil war.
The claim, detailed in Gowon’s autobiography, ‘My Life of Service and Allegiance,’ provides a deeply personal account of the failed peace talks, political mistrust, and constitutional disputes that shattered negotiations between the federal military government and the Eastern Region prior to the 1967-1970 Civil War.
Gowon wrote in his book about the tensions that arose after the January and July 1966 coups, as well as the circumstances that led to Nigeria’s war.
“Ojukwu deliberately and effectively thwarted every effort we made to amicably resolve our national issues,” Gowon wrote.
The former military ruler stated that multiple attempts were made to establish a political settlement following the killings of Igbos in Northern Nigeria, which sparked outrage, fear, and increased separatist pressure in the Eastern Region.
According to him, the federal military leadership accepted to the January 1967 summit in Aburi, Ghana, because they believed dialogue could still prevent the federation’s collapse.
“We went to Aburi with open minds and with the sincere hope of finding a basis for national reconciliation,” Gowon said.
The summit, arranged by former Ghanaian commander Lt.-Gen. Joseph Arthur Ankrah, brought together Nigeria’s senior military officers at a time when the country was already under great strain due to coups, ethnic massacres, and growing hostility within the armed forces.
However, Gowon stated that the talks ran into trouble after both sides returned from Ghana with different interpretations of what had been agreed.
According to him, the Biafran warlord’s interpretation of the Aburi Accord would have weakened the authority of the federal government and left the country too fragile to survive as one nation.
“What was presented by Ojukwu as the Aburi Accord was, in reality, his own interpretation of our discussions,” he wrote.
Gowon said his government was stuck between rising regional tensions and fears that adopting Ojukwu’s demands would hasten the country’s disintegration.
Even still, he insisted that attempts to avoid conflict continued. “At every stage, we tried to preserve Nigeria without resorting to war,” Gowon said.
The autobiography revisits the long-running controversy over whether the Aburi Accord marked Nigeria’s last true chance for peace or whether the country had already moved too close to conflict for any accord to be possible.
Gowon rejected charges that the federal administration negotiated in bad faith, describing the period as one of fear, suspicion, and fast-diminishing confidence among military and political officials trying to keep the federation together.
“Ojukwu’s actions made peaceful settlement increasingly difficult,” he wrote.
Gowon acknowledged the fear and trauma felt by Eastern Nigerians living outside their region after the failed coups of 1966.
He expressed concern about the massacre of Igbos, which complicated efforts to rebuild national trust during a time of high tensions.
“I understood the fears of the Easterners. But the breakup of Nigeria was never an option I could accept,” Gowon stated.
The former head of state stated that communication between both parties gradually worsened in the months running up to Biafra’s declaration on May 30, 1967, as suspicion hardened attitudes and compromise became more difficult.
“We were confronted with a situation in which compromise was becoming almost impossible,” Gowon wrote.
He also justified the federal military government’s decision to form 12 states shortly before Biafra’s declaration, claiming that the move was intended to alleviate worries of control among minority ethnic groups while also minimizing power concentration within regions.
According to him, some minority towns in the former Eastern Region sought direct federal recognition and were concerned about being politically overshadowed.
“The creation of states was intended to give all groups a sense of belonging within Nigeria,” he said.
Gowon denied that the federal administration was eager for conflict, claiming that military confrontation became unavoidable only after Biafra’s declaration.
“Ojukwu’s declaration of Biafra left the federal government with no choice,” he wrote.
The former military ruler defended the ‘No Victor, No Vanquished’ policy announced at the end of the Civil War in January 1970, stating that reconciliation and reintegration were necessary to rebuild the country after years of bloodshed.
He argued that the war was fought to preserve Nigeria’s unity rather than punish any ethnic group.
“We fought to keep Nigeria one, not to destroy a people,” Gowon wrote.
Reflecting on the humanitarian toll of the war, which lost millions of lives and displaced many others, Gowon stated that the postwar period demanded prudence, reconciliation, and concerted attempts to prevent long-term national division.
“We had to think about the future of the country beyond the bitterness of war,” he wrote.
Though Ojukwu maintained until his death in 2011 that Biafra arose as a result of necessity and the Nigerian state’s failure to defend Easterners, Gowon’s biography provides a starkly different narrative, blaming the late Biafran leader for the collapse of peace negotiations.
“We exhausted every peaceful avenue available to us. But Nigeria had to survive,” Gowon wrote.
